MODELING THE DECISION TO BUY FLOOD INSURANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR COASTAL AREAS by Landry, Craig E. & Kriesel, Warren
Modeling the Decision to Buy Flood Insurance: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Areas
Craig Landry
The University of Maryland
and
Warren Kriesel*
The University of Georgia
*corresponding author; please contact at wkriesel@agecon.uga.edu
selected paper to be presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual
Meeting in Orlando, Florida, July 20002
Abstract
A perennial question about the NFIP is: how can participation be increased?  An empirical
analysis reveals that in coastal areas the voluntary participation rate is only nine percent and
identifies important determinants of the insurance purchase decision.  It suggests that insurance
will not discourage undesirable risk management practices in coastal areas.3
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Craig Landry and Warren Kriesel
Introduction
The US Congress is considering changes to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
that involve altering the rate structure and/or the eligibility of coastal properties.  Integral to
understanding the probable effects of such changes are the relationships that exist between
household behavior regarding risk, community response to erosion and flooding hazard, and legal
provisions regarding coastal development.  In an attempt to help clarify these interactions, this
analysis deals with the household flood insurance purchasing decision and how it relates to other
measures of risk reduction (including community response to coastal hazards) and particular
aspects of flood and erosion risk.   
Part of the original intent of the NFIP was to provide incentives which encouraged more
responsible development of the coast.  While the NFIP provided insurance where none had been
offered by the private sector, it also sought to improve building standards so that coastal
development would be better suited to deal with coastal hazards.  Part of the motivation behind
this move seems to have involved internalization of negative externalities relating to the costs of
development in hazardous areas, in particular - disaster assistance.  So, it seems the NFIP has
attempted to alter the nature of coastal development by first providing insurance which increases
the costs of living on the coast (essentially attempting to equalize the marginal social costs of
coastal development with the marginal private benefits), and secondly, by providing building
standards which should improve the survivability of coastal housing during hazardous events.  An
important objective of this analysis is to provide some empirical evidence relating household
decisions involving risk to the NFIP and the terms that the insurance is offered under.  In4
particular, we seek to address the question of whether NFIP would lose many customers if it
raised the price of insurance to an actuarial level.
There are three important issues involved in specifying a model of insurance purchase
behavior. The first is to choose a theoretical framework for explaining individual choice.  The
second is to link the theoretical framework for individual choice to the empirical specification
appropriate for the degree of aggregation of the best available data.  The third is to select the
explanatory variables which capture the most important influences on that choice.  These issues
are dealt with in turn. 
Theoretical Approach
Estimating the market demand for flood insurance product is problematic because each
potential customer has unique risk characteristics and attitudes toward risk.  Therefore, the
decision to purchase insurance is governed by variables that are not directly observable.  This
situation has been modeled within an expected utility maximization framework in standard
economics textbooks (see, eg., Varian, 1984 or 1994).  The essentials of the model are presented
here.
Suppose the coastal dweller owns property that is valued at W and suppose that she has a
subjective probability p that a flood will cause a capital loss L.  The property owner can buy
insurance that will pay her an amount q if the loss happens, and the insurance will cost her a
premium equal to Bq, where B is an actuarial estimate of the loss probability.  The main question
in demand estimation is: how much coverage will the property owner buy?  This is found by
formulating the expected utility model:
max  pu(W !L ! Bq + q) + (1 !p) u(W !Bq)5
which posits that the property owner’s expected well-being is the probability-weighted sum of her
monetary well-being under both of the outcomes.  Maximized expected utility is found by
differentiating this function with respect to the level of insurance coverage, q, and setting the first
order condition equal to zero:
puN (W !L + q
*( 1 !B ))(1 !B) ! (1 ! p) uN (W !Bq
*)B = 0,   or
uN (W !L + q
*( 1 !B ))   ÷  uN (W !Bq
*)   =  (1-p)/p  × B/(1 !B) (1)
where uN is the first derivative of utility and q
* is the optimum coverage.  This condition states that
the property owner will purchase insurance coverage up to the point where her marginal rate of
substitution between consumption in the two outcomes is equal to the price ratio.  The expected
profit for the insurance company is equal to :
!p (1 ! B)q + (1 ! p)Bq 
where the company receives Bq !q if the loss occurs and it receives Bq if it does not. 
Administrative costs are assumed to be zero.  If conditions in the insurance industry are
sufficiently competitive then economic profits will be zero:
!p (1 ! B)q + (1 ! p)Bq = 0
p (1 ! B) = (1 ! p)B or 
 (1 ! B)/B  = (1 ! p)/p (2)
Since the company is just breaking even on the contract it must be charging an actuarially fair
rate, where the price of insurance is equal to its expected value, and p=B.  Substituting (2) into
the first order condition in (1) yields:
uN (W !L + q
*( 1 !B ))   ÷  uN (W !Bq
*)   = 1     or
uN (W !L + q
*( 1 !B ))   =  uN (W !Bq
*)   6
so that the marginal utilities of a dollar are equal regardless of whether the loss occurs or it does
not. 
If the property owner is risk averse then the expected utility function is concave, or
uO(W)<0.  This means she will receive more utility from the certainty of using her current wealth
versus the utility of using that wealth subject to the probability p, and thus will seek to insure
herself.   If the marginal utilities in each state are equal, then under risk aversion it follows that the
total amounts of wealth in each state must also be equal:
W !L + q
*( 1 !B )  =  W !Bq
* , or  
L = q
*
and the property owner will purchase an amount of insurance coverage that fully protects against
the potential loss.  On the other hand, a risk loving homeowner would prefer the prospect of
uncertain wealth rather than the certain outcome and therefore would have no motivation to buy
insurance.  It is noteworthy that this result of full insurance protection depends on the existence,
rather than the degree, of risk aversion.  This is because while a property owner may be risk
averse, she will probably not buy coverage in excess of the loss because she probably has better
competing investment opportunities.  
This prediction of full insurance is at odds with the experience of the NFIP.  Since its
inception, a problem facing the NFIP has been the lack of participation in the program by property
owners at risk of flood losses.  Brown and Hoyt (1999) review the history of claims and find that
in the average year between 1983 and 1993, less than ten percent of flood losses were covered by
insurance.  In the Mississippi River flood of 1993, less than $1 billion of the $12 billion total
damages was covered by federal flood insurance.  This experience is shared by the Federal Crop
Insurance Program, where in 1993 the participation rate was 35 percent of eligible acres, even7
though the average premium is subsidized by 30 percent (Barnett and Skees, 1995). The
mandatory purchase provisions of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 and the Reform Act
of 1994 are efforts to increase the protection of flood prone property.
There are five contributing reasons why the NFIP does not have higher participation
among owners of flood prone property.  Lewis and Nickerson (1989) find that government
disaster relief programs provide a disincentive for purchasing flood insurance.  Property owners
perhaps feel that relief in the form of low interest loans, grants, etc. offer them at least partial
compensation for potential flood losses.  In terms of the utility maximization, the effect of disaster
relief would be to reduce the expected loss L to a lower level and the optimal coverage q* would
be reduced, perhaps to zero if the relief effect is strong enough.
 Kunreuther (1984) argues that people tend to underestimate their chances of being a
disaster victim.  This might result from their having little or no previous experience with flooding
damage.  If their subjective loss probability is too low, then p < B and actuarially-priced insurance
would appear to be too expensive.  The amount of subsidy required for high rates of program
participation is probably untenable.
A third reason comes from the results of MacDonald, et al. (1987), where they raise the
possibility that NFIP under-compensates for losses.  In their case, they show that a property buyer
would desire more of a risk-reducing property characteristic so he could protect himself against
this monetary loss.  In the context of the demand for insurance model presented above, under-
compensation would mean that L > q, so there would not be full insurance and insurance demand
would be reduced from what it would otherwise be.  
A fourth reason could be that coastal property owners view the expected value of the
potential loss as only a small part of their total wealth.   If this is the case, then they could8
effectively self-insure themselves against the loss.  Evidence that coastal property owners are
wealthy is presented later, so this is a real possibility.
Finally, the model’s results only apply to risk averse individuals.  If certain properties
attract risk-taking buyers, such as the properties at the ocean’s edge, then that would be another
factor reducing the demand for insurance.  However, the results of Kriesel, Randall and
Lichtkoppler (1993) from a hedonic price model of lakeshore properties suggest that buyers tend
to put a premium on properties that are better protected from flood and erosion hazards.  This
risk premium could not exist unless the buyers were risk averse.  Therefore, market domination by
risk-loving buyers is probably not a leading cause of low participation in NFIP.
Empirical Specification
Empirical analysis of the insurance purchase decision can be based on a model of random
utility maximization.  The utility of the ith household if flood insurance (subscripted by v) is
purchased is given by Uiv( qv, cv, ,v) where qv is a vector consisting of the land ownership
characteristics associated with the insurance (i.e., probability of loss, insurance payment, etc.), cv
is a composite of all other goods consumed, and ,v is an error term.  The utility associated with
no insurance (subscripted by p) for the ith household is given by Uip(qp, cp, ,p).  Homeowners
evaluate whether the characteristics associated with flood insurance (qv and cv) provide higher
utility than the no insurance alternative.  
The probability of any homeowner choosing to purchase insurance is the expected value of
a random variable Pi which takes on the value 1 if Uiv > Uip and 0 if Uiv < Uip  Because of the
presence of the error term, Uiv and Uip are random variables.  Therefore, the dependent variable in
this study is the proportion of homeowners who purchase flood insurance.  This is given by Dj =9
(3Pvj)/Nj, where N is the total number of homeowners and the subscript j denotes the coastal
community. 
Our dependent variable is a proportion, and each observation actually represents the sum
of individual choices by underlying populations of varying size.  OLS estimates will therefore
suffer from problems of heteroscedasticity, and will be inefficient although unbiased (Greene,
1993).  There are two estimation methods that can be applied to this type of data set: (a)
weighted least squares and (b) maximum likelihood estimation.
In the weighted least squares approach, the dependent variable is the log odds of
purchasing flood insurance ln [Pj / (1 - Pj)], where Pj is the aforementioned proportion of
properties that have flood insurance in community j.  According to Gujarati (1995, p.558), the
weights are provided by a consistent estimator of the  variance of the heteroscedastic errors: 
sj
2 = Nj Pj (1 - Pj)
-1.   
where N is the number of observations in group j.  The estimated equation takes the form:
sj
-1 ln[Pj / (1 - Pj)]  =  sj
-1 " + $ $ (sj
-1  Xj) + uj.
The maximum likelihood estimation is described in Greene (p. 654).  For these data, the
log likelihood function is:
ln L = 3j Nj [Pj ln F (BN NXj) + (1-Pj) ln(1 - F (BN NXj))]
where F is the cumulative distribution function.  This was estimated using Proc Logistic within
SAS.
The sampling frame for this study consisted of eighteen coastal counties that were selected
by FEMA.  Within these counties, approximately 11,000 properties were selected randomly for
inclusion in the study.  For each property, a team of surveyors collected on-site data, another
team collected descriptive data from county courthouses, and we mailed survey questionnaires to10
the property owners during 1998-99.  An overall response rate of 39 percent to our mail survey
was obtained.  In addition we had access to the Federal Insurance Agency’s (FIA) data base for
policies in force for all policy holders in the 18 counties.
In choosing the unit of observation it is preferable to use a definition of  “coastal
community” which yields a geographically small unit with more sample variation than a larger
unit, such as a county, could provide.  Therefore, we used the smallest unit available in our data
sets, the “gps_city” as defined by the U.S. Census.  Another alternative was to use the FIA’s
definition of community.  However, this would have produced larger units of observation with
many properties lumped together in unincorporated parts of their respective counties.
Before deciding whether to buy flood insurance, each property owner must evaluate the
availability and pricing of flood insurance and make a decision based upon risk preferences and
their personal assessment of coastal risk and substitute protection measures (which can include
building standards and community protection projects like sand nourishment, structural
fortification, and dune restoration). The variables we use in this model of participation rates are
described below.
1. Participation - the dependent variable.  The proportion of properties in a community with flood
insurance.  An observation from the sampling frame was deemed to have a NFIP policy if
(a) its address had been matched with an observation from the FIA data set, or if (b) the
survey respondent indicated they had flood insurance.  Source: Federal Insurance
Administration’s policy data for 1997, and survey questionnaire data.
2. Price - the average price of flood insurance in the community per $100 of coverage.  If the
price charged by NFIP is an actuarially fair rate, then Price would be a perfect linear
combination of variables that reflect the property’s riskiness, and Price would add no11
additional explanatory power to the model.  However, the rate charged by NFIP deviates
from an actuarially fair one because there are administrative costs, Increased Cost of
Compliance coverage, and the community probation surcharge.  Also, an out-of-date
FIRM may place a property in the wrong rating class. A negative effect is expected. 
Source: Federal Insurance Administration’s policy data for 1997, and survey questionnaire
data.
3.  Income - average income in the community, as calculated from the survey questionnaires. 
Communities with more income should be able to readily afford insurance.   However,
richer communities may also be able to self-insure their property.  If the former effect
outweighs the latter, then Income should have a positive effect on NFIP participation. 
Source: survey questionnaire data.
4. Waterfront - percent of properties that have frontage on the water.  This variable should have a
positive effect on participation as ocean-front homes should face a higher risk of flooding
and erosive undermine, all else being equal.  Source: on-site survey of properties.
5.  Armor - percent of survey returns indicating the existence of coastal armoring at the nearest
shore. Coastal armoring could serve, similar to nourishment, as a signaling device which
suggests to people the hazards of living in the coastal zone.  This would induce higher
participation.  However, if coastal residents view armoring as a substitute protection
measure, armoring could motivate lower participation.  Source: survey questionnaire data.
6. Sand Nourishment - percent of survey returns indicating that the nearest shore has been
nourished.  Beach nourishment could serve as a substitute for flood insurance if individuals
believe such projects decrease the risk of flooding and erosion hazards (assuming erosion
risk motivates participation).  On the other hand, such projects could serve to educate the12
coastal populace about coastal hazards making them more likely to seek out insurance. 
Source: survey questionnaire data.
7.  Elevation - average elevation above current base flood elevation.  This is a standard measure
of flood risk, and it should have a negative effect on participation.   Source: on-site survey
of properties.
8.  Erosion Rate - average 60-year erosion rate in the community.  A community with a higher
erosion hazard should have higher insurance participation.  Note that the Geotime variable
was not used.  This is because the second component of Geotime, the setback distance,
has a near-zero variance across the set communities because of the sampling procedure. 
Source: on-site survey of properties.
9. Built Post-FIRM - the percent of houses built after the FIRM was promulgated.  Building
codes to ensure flood resistance are instituted when communities enter the NFIP (after a
flood insurance rate map (FIRM) has been completed).  If property owners view a flood-
resistant house as not needing flood insurance, then communities with higher proportions
of post- FIRM houses should have lower participation in NFIP.  Furthermore, a house that
is built Post-FIRM is not supposed to have any part of its insurance premium subsidized,
whereas older houses might be grandfathered into a lower rate.  This price effect should
be a disincentive for newer houses to be insured.  Source: on-site survey of properties.
10.  Hurricane Interval - the mean return period for landfall or nearby passage of a hurricane. 
This variable should control for how communities differ in their experience with the
flooding hazard, and whether their subjective probabilities are accurate.  Source: FEMA,
1998.13
11.  Mortgage - the percent of property owners who indicated that they were required to buy
flood insurance by their mortgage lender.  This is an obvious explanatory variable which
should reflect the FDIC requirement of flood insurance for mortgaged properties, and it
should have a positive effect on participation.  Source: survey questionnaire data.
12.  CBRA - the percent of properties located in a CBRA area where the house was built after
1983.  By law, these properties are prohibited from participating in NFIP, so CBRA
should have a negative effect.   Source: on-site survey of properties.
13.  West - a dummy variable that is one if the community is in California or Oregon, and zero
otherwise.
14.  Gulf - a  a dummy variable that is one if the community is in Texas or western Florida, and
zero otherwise.
These variables are similar to the ones employed by Brown and Hoyt (1999) where they
investigated participation in NFIP using a pooled time series and cross sectional data set
composed of  the 50 states, for the years 1983 to 1993.  In addition to these variables they also
included one that measured the likelihood of government disaster relief, with the hypothesis that
this would serve as another substitute for formal insurance.  However, while the time-series
aspect of their data set contained variation in relief expenditures, our data set does not so it was
pointless to include the variable.
Empirical Results
Information from all three data sources, the on-site survey, the FIA policy data and the
survey questionnaires, were utilized in this analysis.  From the 19 counties for which we have
completed data sets, we were not able to use any counties from the Great Lakes region because
very few properties in those counties had flood insurance.  In addition to these, 16 communities in14
other regions had participation rates of zero and these had to be excluded from the analysis
because no insurance price variable could be calculated for them.  From the remaining 12 counties
there were 62 communities with complete data that were used in the regression analysis.  The data
used in this analysis are community-wide averages that are compiled from 7,521 individual
properties.  
The summary statistics of the variables used in the participation regression are presented in
Table 1.  In the average community in this sample, 40.4 percent of the properties from our
sampling frame of 10,000 have flood insurance, and this varies from 1.4 up to 81 percent. 
Insurance Price has an average of $0.45 per $100 coverage and this varies from a low of $0.09 to
a high of $1.23.   Since all of these properties, by definition, are located in a 100-year flood zone,
the actuarial rate for their insurance should average at least $1 per $100 coverage.  Thus, the
amount of subsidy for these properties is significant.
In the average community, 40 percent of the properties are on the water front.  It is
interesting to note that 31 percent of the survey respondents in the average community indicated
that they had been required to buy insurance.  If this is subtracted from the average participation
rate, the result suggests that of all the owners for whom insurance was not required only eight
percent elected to buy flood insurance. 
The regression results are reported in Table 2.  The weighted least squares model
performs quite well with a 76 percent r-square, and three of the twelve independent variables are
significant at the 0.2 percent level, another two are significant at the 0.05 level, and two are
significant at the 0.001 level.  These variables are Income, Waterfront, Armor, Elevation, Built
Post-FIRM, Mortgage, and Pacific and they have their hypothesized signs.  The maximum
likelihood procedure produced betas that are very close to the weighted least squares, but the15
standard errors are reduced by half.  As a result the significance levels for all the variables are
much higher.  In addition to the variables that were significant before, Hurricane Interval and
Gulf join the list.
The results suggest that communities with a higher proportion of water front properties
will have higher participation rates.  Those with a higher proportion of houses built after
publication of the FIRM will also have higher participation in NFIP, and this result is contrary to
our expectation that people would be less inclined to keep a policy for a house that is damage
resistant.  Apparently, people buy insurance for these newer houses as a result of the mortgage
requirement and they tend to keep the policies in force.  The fact that the house is more resistant
to storm damage provides little disincentive for buying insurance.  Furthermore, it can be
concluded that  property buyers do not tend to view a house’s damage resistance as a substitute
for formal insurance, but rather resistance might be a complementary good.
Table 2's results also suggest that communities where more mortgage borrowers had been
required to buy the insurance will have higher participation rates.  This effect had also been
hypothesized by Brown and Hoyt (1999) and the authors of the GAO report (1983), but to their
surprise both of those studies found a negative relationship between the demand for flood
insurance and FHA mortgages.  Their unexpected results were probably due to an inexact
relationship between FHA mortgages and flood insurance requirements. Also, Kunreuther (1996)
has noted that the requirements are easily avoided.
Communities with more houses built after 1983 in CBRA areas have higher participation. 
This positive effect was not expected, but it is not signficantly different from zero.  Communities
with higher average incomes have higher participation rates, so flood insurance is a normal good. 16
If higher incomes had been associated with lower participation, this would have been evidence in
favor of self-insurance as a reason for low participation in NFIP, however this is not the case.
There are four property characteristics that are potential substitutes for formal insurance. 
Armor and Sand Nourishment and Elevation all have a negative effect on NFIP participation. 
This means that communities that have more properties with these types of protection have less
NFIP participation, implying that they are substitutes for flood insurance.   Also, as the
community’s average erosion rate decreases so does its participation, so that natural erosion
resistence could also be an insurance substitute.  However, of these four variables only Armor and
Elevation are weakly significant and the other two show no significance.  This result, that there is
no strong evidence that certain property characteristics might be insurance substitutes, tends to
agree with the result of our other, separate hedonic price analysis for these properties (Kriesel,
Landry and Keeler).  That result showed that even though property buyers have the option of
buying insurance, they still place price premiums on properties with natural and/or man-made
protection from flooding and erosion risks.   This result is incompatible with the notion that
natural protection and formal insurance are equal substitutes in providing asset protection.  As in
the hedonic model an explanation for this could be that buyers regard flood insurance as
incomplete asset protection.  The model of expected utility maximization presented earlier in this
paper suggested that homeowners will seek to insure themselves fully and as a result they prefer
having natural protection in addition to flood insurance.   Therefore, formal insurance is probably
a complement to natural and/or man-made risk protection.
Because our data lacked variation, a direct test of how disaster relief programs affect
participation was impossible.   However, we can say that relief programs probably do not have a
major role in reducing NFIP participation.  If the role had been very important, then we should17
have observed zero impact from Armor and Elevation.  This is because disaster relief would not
only reduce NFIP participation but it would also crowd out the protection offered by natural
flood and erosion protection.  This proposition is reinforced by our hedonic modeling results. 
There, if buyers were forming their bid prices with the expectation that disaster relief would
reduced their risk to zero, then there could be no price premiums for properties with Geotime and
Elevation, but that was not the case.
Of particular importance is the effect of Price on NFIP participation.  In Table 2, the Price
coefficient is positive, contrary to our expectations but the effect is never significantly different
from zero.  Previous studies of NFIP participation have shown a low degree of price
responsiveness.  Brown and Hoyt estimated a price elasticity of -0.320, and the 1983 study by the
GAO reports an elasticity of -0.38.  In a study of Federal crop insurance, another insurance
product that has many characteristics in common with NFIP, Barnett and Skees estimated price
elasticities ranging from -0.14 to -0.33.  Our results do not refute those findings of a low price
response.
A more clear-cut test of price responsiveness could have been performed by deleting from
the data set those mortgage borrowers who had been required to buy flood insurance.  Then, the
analysis would be performed on only those property owners who had discretion about their
insurance participation.  However, while it is easy to identify these observations from the survey
questionnaires it was impossible to identify them from the FIA data.  This inability to weed out
completely the mortgage borrowers would have yielded results that were misleading.
If FEMA were to change substantially the premiums for NFIP policies, how would
property owners react, given that the range of our insurance prices was from a low of $0.09 to a
high of $1.23, and the average was $0.45?  We feel that price increases within this range would18
probably not cause significant reaction by NFIP policy holders. Higher price increases would
probably cause outrage among some policy holders and they might cancel their policies. 
However, the owners who might do this are the ones not required to have insurance and they
amount to only eight percent of properties at risk of flooding.  If price increases were phased in
over a period of a few years, FEMA could probably avoid complaints and bad publicity.  
These conclusions were reached because the data suggest that people are motivated buy
flood insurance for reasons other than price, such as whether they are water front, the mortgage
requirement, etc.  If the opposite occurred and FEMA lowered prices, we doubt that property
owners would respond by buying more policies.   Indeed, NFIP was characterized by very low
participation in the 1970's when policies were highly subsidized. 
Conclusions
This model of participation in NFIP has been formulated to address a very specific
question: If insurance rates were raised to actuarially fair levels, how many people would opt out
of NFIP?   A result from this model is that the average price of insurance (per $100 coverage) in
the community does not have a statistically significant effect on participation in NFIP.  Price
insensitivity is a result almost guaranteed because the data reveal that out of all the people in these
flood-risk areas who were not required to buy flood insurance, only eight percent purchased it
voluntarily.  Other factors such as the requirements by mortgage lenders and the property’s
Waterfront status have a more important role than Price in determining the decision to buy flood
insurance.  The mortgage requirement will probably not encourage more participation in the
future because so many coastal properties are bought with cash.  This result is from the hedonic
price model reported in Kriesel, Landry and Keeler, where it was estimated that 34 percent of
coastal properties were purchased with cash, versus a national cash-purchase rate of 11 percent.19
In the introduction, five reasons were cited for low participation in NFIP: (1) property
owners think that government disaster relief programs will compensate them, (2) owners
systematically underestimate their subjective probabilities of loss, (3) owners’ perceptions that
NFIP undercompensates for losses, (4) owners can self-insure, and (5) owners of coastal property
are risk takers.  Of these five reasons, our results can only refute the fourth and fifth as major
causes.  
The fourth reason is ruled out because higher incomes are associated with higher
participation, so self-insurance cannot be predominant. Concerning the fifth reason, if risk loving
preferences prevailed among these owners, then our finding that Armor and Elevation are
negatively associated with participation could not have been made.  Furthermore, these variables
could have had no effect in the hedonic price models for these properties unless buyers tended to
be risk averse.  
Concerning reasons (1) and (2) we doubt that they reduce NFIP participation in a major
way.  Again if they had been big influences then we could not have observed any significant role
for risk-reducing property characteristics in these results or the hedonic results. This leaves reason
#3, undercompensation by NFIP, as the most likely major cause of low participation with the
other three factors having minor contributions to the problem.  As noted by anyone who has
experienced a car accident, undercompensation is an inherent feature of all insurance.
The finding of the unimportance of insurance price in this model of NFIP participation and
the hedonic price model agrees with the historical experience of NFIP.  Many of the articles on
NFIP from the early 1970's addressed the problem of how to get more people voluntarily enrolled
in the Program.  This was during an era of highly subsidized, low insurance prices.  Even though
the insurance was inexpensive, few people bought flood insurance until recently when its purchase20
was made mandatory under mortgage requirements, and the benefits of NFIP were advertized to
the public.
The final implication of these results is what they mean for preserving fragile coastal
environments.  It has been noted that good beach conditions cannot coexist with artificial erosion
protection structures such as seawalls and groins.  Thus, as owners protect themselves from
flooding and erosion risks they also contribute to beach and ecosystem destruction. If it could
have been shown that formal insurance is a substitute for the property protection afforded by
seawalls, then a wide range of policy tools to encourage higher participation in NFIP would have
the beneficial side-effect of reducing seawall construction.  However, this is not the case.  Our
results show a positive relationship between man-made risk-reducing attributes and formal
insurance.  This indicates that insurance availability will not reduce seawall construction and other
methods of limiting human impacts on coastal ecosystems must be investigated.
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Participation Rate 0.404 0.204 0.014 0.811
Price ($/$100 coverage) 0.455 0.282 0.094 1.236
Income (thousands) 106.132 37.643 28.958 203.416
Waterfront 0.404 0.173 0.012 0.801
Armor 0.185 0.229 0 1
Sand Nourishment 0.295 0.310 0 0.947
Elevation (feet) 10.143 17.931 -4.651 84.389
Erosion Rate (feet/year) 2.173 2.597 0.010 13.633
Hurricane Interval (years) 32.376 41.788 3.900 97.000
Built Post-FIRM 0.671 0.269 0.047 1
Mortgage 0.317 0.207 0 0.768
CBRA 0.028 0.078 0 0.379
Pacific Region (0-1) 0.209 0.410 0 1
Gulf Region (0-1) 0.209 0.410 0 123
Table 2: Regression Results for the NFIP Participation Model, 62 Coastal Communities, 1998-99.





Variable Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error
Intercept -2.305 0.525*** -2.427 0.253***
Price ($ per $100 coverage) 0.059 0.334 0.094 0.165
Income (thousands) 0.005 0.002** 0.005 0.001***
Waterfront 0.683 0.464* 0.719 0.226***
Armor -0.443 0.347* -0.471 0.169**
Sand Nourishment -0.095 0.280 -0.108 0.132
Elevation (feet) -0.009 0.007* -0.010 0.003**
Erosion Rate (feet/year) 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.012
Hurricane Interval (years) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001*
Built Post-FIRM 1.450 0.363*** 1.539 0.176***
Mortgage 1.571 0.535** 1.608 0.256***
CBRA 0.548 1.194 0.693 0.580
Pacific Region (0-1) -1.315 0.362*** -1.343 0.174***
Gulf Region (0-1) -0.241 0.207 -0.266 0.102**
  
 N = 62 cities; * indicates that the variable is significant at the 0.2 level or lower, ** is significant
at the 0.05 level, and *** means it is significant at the 0.001 level.